Abstract
Introduction
Humans often behave altruistically, even towards genetically unrelated 28 strangers. While some of this behavior can likely be explained by concerns for one's 29 (possibly third-party) reputation, this does not seem to be the complete story. Tightly 30 controlled economic experiments have repeatedly shown that subjects behave in an 31 altruistic manner to anonymous strangers even when opportunities for repeated 32 interaction and reputation formation are systematically ruled out (cf. Camerer, 2003) . 33 A recent line of research has added to the debate on human cooperation by showing 34 that subtle, irrelevant cues can have a dramatic impact on altruistic behavior. In 35 particular, it has demonstrated that the mere presence of a picture of a pair of eyes, or 36 an eye-like stimulus leads to a significant increase in altruistic behavior (Bateson et The common interpretation of this finding adopts a reputation building 41 perspective on human altruism. According to this view, eye cues trigger feelings of 42 being watched, and thereby, of being socially evaluated. This, consequently, leads 43 people to act altruistically to keep up a good reputation. Such an argument seems 44 plausible, given that actual opportunities to acquire a positive reputation that may pay 45 off in the future have been found to enhance pro-social behavior (Engelmann & While not often recognized, a general reputation based account for the effect 55 of eyes implies that its influence should not be limited to triggering pro-social 56 behavior. Studies investigating the impact of eyes or eye-like stimuli have thus far 57 focused exclusively on interaction tasks; i.e., tasks in which one person's decisions 58 influence the outcomes of others. Concerns for social evaluation and reputation, 59 however, are more general and their effect should extend to other tasks as well. When 60 people know they are being judged or expect to be judged later on, they will not only 61 care about signaling a cooperative disposition, but will also want to make decisions 62 more carefully to avoid mistakes and to be able to justify their choices. Psychological 63 research indeed finds that people adjust their behavior if they expect to be evaluated, 64 even in individual decision making tasks where their decisions do not influence the 65 outcomes of others (Kruglanski & Fruend, 1983 ; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Vieider, 66 2011). When subjects know the prevailing view among their audience, they attempt to 67 make decisions that comply with this view to win their approval. When they do not 68 know the view of their evaluators, they generally engage in pre-emptive self criticism, 69 carefully analyzing the problem to arrive at more justifiable decisions (Lerner & 70 Tetlock 1999). If eye-like stimuli indeed induce social-evaluation and reputation 71 concerns, their impact should thus not be limited to triggering pro-social behavior in 72 interaction tasks, but also extend to choices in individual decision making tasks. Interestingly, alternative explanations for the effect of eyes on social behavior 75 may not lead to the same prediction. Another well studied mechanism would indeed 76 suggest that the impact of eye gaze is limited to triggering pro-social behavior in 77 interaction tasks, and will not influence behavior in individual decision making tasks. 78 This mechanism relies on the fact that eye gaze plays a crucial part in establishing and 79 maintaining relations of dominance and submissiveness: a direct gaze can be a signal 80 of confrontation and authority which will often create feelings of discomfort, whereas 81 reversion of one's eyes can be perceived as a sign of fear or submission. Biological 82 research shows that animals living in hierarchical social systems typically associate 83 eyes with the threat of punishment by more dominant members (Emery, 2000) . Dogs, 84 for example, are more likely to show obedience when human eyes are upon them 85 (Call et al., 2003) . Similarly, non-human primates exhibit more submissive behavior, 86 such as lip-smacking and teeth chattering, when watched by conspecifics (Emery, 87 2000; Öhman, 1986) . Related neuroscientific research has revealed that humans detect 88 and respond to eyes and faces automatically (e.g., Wahlen et al., 1998), and that 89 humans and non-human primates share a similar neural architecture for recognizing 90 and reacting to eyes and faces (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Emery, 2000) . This suggests that 91 such responses are ingrained by evolution and inherited from our primate ancestors These findings imply that the increase in pro-social behavior found in response to eye 96 primes could also be a form of submissiveness, triggering appeasement behaviors 97 (Gilbert, 2001 Second, in addition to a benchmark treatment, which uses socially neutral 117 primes, and an "eyes" treatment, we implement a "peers" treatment in which pictures 118 of our subjects' social group (i.e., university students) are displayed during the 119 experiment. This treatment is added with the aim of inducing social evaluation and 120 reputation concerns by directly reminding subjects of relevant others. Our dual strategy of (1) expanding the range of tasks employed, and (2) 123 including an additional treatment in the experiment, which acts as reference point for We constructed a replica of the ESE website (Figure 1) At the end of the experiment, students answered demographic questions 203 (gender, age, nationality, education) and stated whether they used calculators during 204 the experiment (this was relevant for one of the tasks, as we will explain in section 6).
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Three subjects did not complete the demographic questionnaire. Some of the answers 206 for the first task described below were missing and about sixty subjects were asked to 207 re-enter them (twelve did not). Because this affected every treatment equally, there 208 was no reason to believe that it would affect our results. We nonetheless studied 209 whether it had any effect on our results and found that it had none (see electronic 210 supplementary material). For each task, we first report simple non-parametric tests for 211 treatment differences and then apply more advanced, parametric statistical models that 212 control for subjects' characteristics. To achieve a significant amount of destruction and thereby facilitate the 235 investigation of possible differences between our treatments, we adopted the "hidden" The prediction of the social evaluation mechanism is clear in this task, and it 247 therefore allows for a validation that our "peers" prime has the desired effect. There is 248 no compelling rationale behind destruction: it is harmful to others and costly to 249 11/37 oneself. Consequently, destroying will likely be negatively evaluated by peers and, 250 thus, social evaluation concerns should lead to lower destruction rates. Note that this 251 prediction is consistent with the past findings on the JoD, which suggest that 252 destruction mainly occurs in situations where behavior cannot be perfectly observed. 
Results
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The overall destruction rate we obtain over the three treatments is similar to To show the robustness of these findings, Table 1 displays the results of a   273 Probit model on the probability that a participant destroys the endowment of another 274 12/37 participant controlling for background characteristics of our subjects. In particular, we 275 find that the destruction rates drops significantly, by approximately 17.7 percentage 276 points in the "eyes" and 14.4 percentage points in the "peers" treatment as compared 277 to the benchmark when we control for background characteristics. With regard to 278 background characteristics, we find no significant effects apart from nationality. In 279 our sample, Dutch students are 25.5 percentage points less likely to destroy. The second interaction task was the Dictator game, which is widely-studied in 291 economics and demonstrates what is often deemed to be pure altruism on the part of 292 the subjects (Camerer, 2003; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003) . In this game, one subject, past studies found donation rates to be significantly higher after priming with eyes. 300 Including this task in our experiment, thus, provides us with the opportunity to see 301 whether we could replicate this eye effect in our web-based set-up. 
Results
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The standard finding with respect to the dictator game is that over 60 percent As we did with the JoD mini-game, we apply regression techniques to assess 352 treatment effects after controlling for potential disturbances due to differences in 353 background characteristics. Table 1 shows the results of a Probit model on the 354 probability that a participant allocates a non-zero amount to another participant.
355
Controlling for background characteristics increases the significance of the "eyes" When assessing the amount given by a participant, we use a Tobit estimation 369 procedure to account for the fact that our dependent variable "Amount given" is 370 censored between €0 and €50. In line with past findings, we observe that the majority of subjects chooses Bag K in 456 our benchmark treatment, only a small fraction selecting the ambiguous Bag U (N = 457 55, 14.45%, see Figure 4a ). It is interesting to note that we find no effect of "eyes" (N The analyses thus show a robust effect of the "peers" treatment. from a bag with 9 black chips and 1 red chip when one is allowed to try four times).
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The cause for this bias is often thought to be a realization of the anchoring and 491 adjustment heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) . It is believed that the subjects 492 look at the compound event and think about the probability of drawing a particular we find that subjects in the "peers" treatment make significantly fewer errors In the current paper, we applied a dual strategy to test whether subtle eye cues induce The table displays results for the regression analyses of subjects' decisions in the social interaction tasks. The decision to destroy in the JoD (yes or no) is modeled by a Probit regression model, as is the decision to give away money (yes or no) in the Dictator game. The actual amount given in the Dictator game (unconditional on giving) is captured by a Tobit model, which corrects for censoring of the data between 0 and 50 euro. The variables "Eyes" treatment and "Peers" treatment are dummy variables taking the value 1 if the subject participated in the particular treatment (Benchmark treatment serving as reference). Age measures the subjects age is years, gender is a dummy taking the value 1 if the subject is female, and Nationality is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the subject is Dutch. A number of year of study variables take the value 1 if the subject is in a particular year of education, first year Bachelor students and other categories being the reference category. Using a calculator is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the contestant admitted to having used a calculator in the experiment. In the Probit models, the marginal effect evaluated around the covariate means is shown, giving the estimates a quantitative interpretation.
For both Probit and Tobit models, robust standard errors were used to calculate significance. P-values are between parentheses. 
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